Hogan v. Ingold [DISSENT] by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
4-22-1952
Hogan v. Ingold [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Securities Law Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Hogan v. Ingold [DISSENT]" (1952). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 413.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/413
802 HoGAN v. INaor,D [38 0.2d 
warrant the reversal of a judgment on the ground that it can-
not be ascertained ·which instruction was followed by the 
jury." 
[ would therefon~ reverse the judgment. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 16, 
1952. Carter, J ., \Yas of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
[L. A. Ro. 21794. In Bank. Apr. 22, 1952.] 
GLADYS HOGAN, as Executrix, etc., Appellant, v. R. F. 
INGOLD et al., Respondents. 
[la, lb] Corporations-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Be-
half of Corporation.-By bringing a stockholder's derivative 
action the plaintiff nominates hin:tself to act in a fiduciary 
capacity substantially as a guardian acl litem for the corpo-
ration, and he has no vested property right which compels 
the court to accept him unconditionally in that capacity. 
[2] !d.-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of Cor-
poration.-Corp. Code, § 834, prescribing the conditions pre-
cedent to maintenance of a stockholder's derivative action, is 
not designed and does not operate to deprive a shareholder 
of any vested property right. 
[3] !d.--Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of Cor-
poration.-Sinee Corp. Code, § 834, is directed only at actions 
instituted or maintained "in the right" of the corporation, 
it has no application to actions or suits seeking directly to 
enforce personal rights of shareholders. 
[ 4] !d.-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of Corpo-
ration.-A stockholder does not bring an action on behalf of 
a corporation because his rights have been directly violated, 
or because the cause of action is his or because he is entitled 
to the relief soug·ht; he is permitted to sue in this manner 
simply to set in motion the judicial machinery of the court. 
[5] !d.-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of Corpo-
ration.-A stockholder who institutes an action on behalf of a 
corporation is a trustee, seeking in the name of another a re-
covery for wrongs which have been committed against that 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Corporations, ~ 456; Am.Jur., Corporations, 
§ 461. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-4, 6-11, 14, 15] Corporations, § 353; 
[ 5] Corporations, § 360; [12, 13] Costs, § 3. 
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other; his position in the litigation is similar to that of a 
guardian ad litem, and he is not pc~rmitted to take any act 
without sanction of the court. 
[6a, 6b] !d.-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of 
Corporation.-Formulation of regulations for a stockholder's 
derivative action, including determination of what qualifica-
tions shall be required of a plaintiff in order that he may in-
stitute and maintain a suit in equity "in the right" of another, 
is a matter manifestly appropriate for state legislation, which 
must be upheld so long as no constitutional rights are invaded. 
[7] !d.-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of Corpo-
ration.-Since Corp. Code, § 834, is applied only to actions 
instituted after its enactment, it is neither substantive in 
character nor retroactive in operation; it docs not in and of 
itself create any liability or deprive anyone of property or of 
any vested right either with or without clue process, nor does 
it impair the obligation of any contract. 
[8] !d.-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of Cor-
poration.-Corp. Code, § 834, applies to a fiduciary action 
brought in respect to wrongs assertedly perpetrated before the 
statute as well as to wrongs happening after the statute, as 
long as the action is brought after the effective elate of the 
legislation. 
[9] !d.-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of Corpo-
ration.-·whether a stockholder's derivative action concerns 
wrongs all<>geclly committed before or after the elate Corp. 
Code, § 834, became effective, the operation of the statute is 
prospective and procedural because it does not deprive a 
person of any right which he had at the time of beginning 
the suit, but merely prescribes the conditions on which the 
subsequently in~tituted equity suit may be brought and main-
tained. 
[10] !d.-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of Cor-
poration.-It is only in rrspect to a stockholder's claimed un-
conditional right to institute nnd maintain the fiduciary action 
in the right of tlw corporation, and to be unconditionally 
accepted by the court in that capacity, that the stockholder's 
elaim of impairment goe~; Corp. Code, ~ 834, does not abolish 
stockholder's derivative suits, but merely imposes regulatory 
conditions on their institution and maintenance. 
[11] !d.-Stockholders-Suing and Defending on Behalf of Cor-
poration.-That part of Corp. Code, § 834, which authorizes 
[11] Constitutionality, construction and application of statutes 
requiring security for costs or e.xpenses in case of stockholder's 
aetion in right of corporation, note, 159 A.L.R. 978. 
804 
the court on motion and in the exercise of a reasonable dis-
cretion to require . tb.at :riaintiff in a derivative suit furnish 
security for "the probable reasonable expenses, including. at-
torney's fees," of th~ defendants sued, "which will b~ in~urred 
·in the defense of the action?' and which requires dismissal of 
the action on p1ai]1tiff's failure to comply with the order within 
. a reasonable time :fixed by the court, is not retroactive when 
· applied to actions subsequently commenced even though the 
cause of action accrued before enactment. 
[12] Costs""'-What Law GoV:erns,~Costil are given only by statu-
tory direction and their allowance depends on the terms of the 
statute at the tinie t)f the accrual of the right to have them 
taxed. · · 
[131 Ia.-.:.what Law Governs.'-'-Whetl;ter costs may be allowed in 
an action pr suit, 'as well as determination of the method of 
their computation, is governed by th.eiaw as it exists at the 
time of the judgment whi~h terminates the action. or suit, 
rather thlj.n by the law as it existed at the time whenthe 
action o~ . suit was col:nme~eed, where there is. no. provision 
iri connection with the new. legislation which «J1early saves 
or excepts therefrom> costs iU: pendiJlg actions. 
[14] .•. Oo:rporations--Stock:h~l(lel's~Suing and Defending. on ~ehalf 
of Oornoratl.on.-'l'here .is nothing in Corp. Code, § 4, declaring 
that "N p ~.etion . . . con:nnen.ced before tliif) code takes ef£ect, 
andnorig'lit a.e.e:rued,·is affeeted .. by. the provisio:ns of this code, 
but ~ll proce<lure thereafter• take11 therein. shall conform. to the 
provisions of this code so :fat as possible," which implies that 
Gorp. Code, § 834; shall not be .applied .to actions commenced 
.after ~ts effective date. . .. ·· .. 
[15] Id;:-Stocltholders.,.;:_Su:ing and D~fending On ~ehalf ot Oor-
poration.--,.SiMe power. of state· over institut1on ·a:nd rnainte-. 
nance. of stockholder's derivative actions. is plenary, there is 
no .''right. accrued" in the shareholder to he dec.ted, and· t]Ie 
d.e.elared policy· o;f' the.state as. to• aJ:l procedure to be taken in 
such a.ctious l'l,fter · the effeetiye d.ate of Corp. Code, § 8S41 
should be &'iven effect; · 
APPEAL from an orjler of the Superior. Court of. Los 
Angeles County dismissing a ~t9e:Rholp.er's 4eriv£l;tive action. 
Arnold Praeger, Judge. Affirmeq. · 
M~LaiigJ:tlin· & •• casey for _Appel~ant . 
. [IS] Statute relatingto 13osts or attor11eys' ;f~es at commenee-
ment or.at termiAationo£ ~~tion.as. controlling, note, 9~ A.L.E,. 
1428. See; also,, Oal.Jur., Costs, §§ 2,. 43; All1~Jur., Cost~, §§ 31 4c. 
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Kenny & Morris and Robert vV. Kenny, as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Appellant. 
Flint & MacKay, William R. Flint, Roscoe C. Andrews, 
J.D. Willard and Hunter & Liljestrom for Respondents. 
SCHAUER, ,J.-This case presents to this court for the 
first time the question as to whether section 834 of the 
Corporations Code 1 (Stats. 1949, ch. 499, § 1) is validly appli-
cable to a stockholder's derivative suit commenced after the 
effective date of the statute but concerning wrongs allegedly 
committed before that date and which suit is instituted by a 
shareholder who acquired his stock otherwise than by opera-
tion of law, and at a time subsequent to the commission of 
the wrongs complained of but prior to enactment of the stat-
ute. We conclude that the statute is procedural, that appli-
cation of it here is prospective and does not divest the plain-
tiff of any substantive vested right, and that the order of the 
trial court dismissing the action for failure to furnish security 
for costs and expenses as required should be affirmed. 
The legislation in question imposes two principal conditions 
on the institution and maintenance of stockholder's derivative 
suits: (1) The complaint must allege that plaintiff "was a 
1Section 834: " (a) No action may be instituted or maintained in 
the right of any domestic or foreign corporation by the holder or holders 
of shares, or of voting trust certi:flcates representing shares, of such cor-
poration unless both of the following conditions exist: 
"(1) The plaintiff alleges in the complaint that he was a registered 
shareholder or the holder of voting trust certificates at the time of 
the transaction or any part thereof of which he complains or that his 
shares or voting trust certificates thereafter devolved upon him by 
operation of law from a holder who was a holder at the time of the 
transaction or any part thereof complained of. 
"(2) The plaintiff R.lleges in the complaint with particularity his 
efforts to secure from the board of directors such action as he desires 
and alleges further that he has either informed the corporation or such 
board of directors in writing of the ultimate facts of each cause of 
action against each defendant director or delivered to the corporation 
or such board of directors a true copy of the complaint which he pro-
poses to file, and the reasons for his failure to obtain such action or 
the reasons for not making such effort. 
" (b) In any such action, at any time within thirty days after ser-
vice of summons upon the corporation or any defendant, the corpora-
tion or such defendant may move the court for an order, upon notice 
and hearing, requiring the plaintiff to furnish security as hereinafter 
provided. Such motion may be based upon one or more of the follow-
ing grounds: 
"(1) That there is no reasonable probability that the prosecution 
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registered shareholder . . . at the time of the transaction or 
any part thereof of which he complains'' or that the shares 
devolved npon him by operation of law from one who was 
a registered shareholder at such time. (2) On motion (on the 
grounds specified in the statute and hereinafter epitomized) 
the court may require the plaintiff to furnish security for 
"the probable reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, 
of the corporation and the moving party which will be in-
curred in the defense of the action.'' On failure to furnish 
the required security within a reasonable time to be fixed by 
the court ''the action shall be dismissed.'' 
The grounds upon which the motion for security may be 
based are : (a) That there is no reasonable probability that 
prosecution of the cause of action alleged against the moving 
of the cause of action alleged in the complaint against the moving party 
will benefit the corporation or its security holders; 
"(2) That the moving party, if other than the corporation, did not 
participate in the transaction complained of in any capacity. 
'' 'l'he court on application of the corporation or any defendant may, 
for good cause shown, extend such 30-day period for an additional 
period or periods uot exceeding sixty days. 
''At the hearing upon such motion, the court shall consider such 
evidence, written or oral, by witnesses or affidavit, as may be material: 
(a) to the ground or grounds upon which the motion is based, or 
(b) to a determination of the probable reasonable expenses, including 
attorney's fees, of the corporation and the moving party which will 
be incurred in the defense of the action. If the court determines, after 
hearing the evidence adduced by the parties at the hearing, that the 
moving party has established a probability in support of any of the 
grounds upon which the motion is based, the court shall fix the nature 
and amount of security to be furnished by the plaintiff for reasonable 
expenses, including attorney's fees, which may be incurred by the 
moving party and the corporation in connection with such action, includ-
ing expenses for which said corporation may become liable pursuant to 
Section 830. A determination by the court that security either shall or 
shall not be furnished or shall be furnished as to one or more defend-
ants and not as to others, shall not he deemed a determination of any one 
or more issues in the action or of the merits thereof. The corporation 
and the moving party shall have recourse to such security in such 
amount as the court shall determine upon the termination of such 
action. The amount of such security may thereafter from time to time 
be increased or decreased in the discretion of the court upon showing 
that the security provided has or may become inadequate or is excessive. 
If the court, upon any such motion, makes a determination that security 
shall be furnished by the plaintiff as to any one or more defendants, 
the action shall be dismissed as to such defendant or defendants, unless 
the security required by the court shall have been furnished within such 
reasonable time as may be fixed by the court. 
" (c) If any such motion is filed, no pleadings need he filed by the 
corporation or any other defendant, and the prosecution of such action 
shall he stayed, until 10 days after such motion shall have been dis-
posed of.'' 
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party will benefit the corporation or its security holders; 
(b) That the moving party, if other than the corporation, did 
not participate in the transaction complained of in any capac-
ity. The trial court in this proceeding concluded that ground 
(a) was established; its conclusion was amply supported if 
the statute is valid and applicable. 
Plaintiff's complaint was filed on December 9, 1949; sec-
tion 834 of the Corporations Code had become effective Octo-
ber 1, 1949; plaintiff became a stockholder not earlier than 
March, 1949, on conveyance to him by one Finnegan of 215 
shares. All the transactions complained of, with one excep-
tion hereinafter noted, occurred prior to plaintiff's becoming 
a shareholder. The one transaction excepted (alleged leasing 
of property, with option to purchase at below its market 
value, to an organization controlled by defendants) assertedly 
took place on October 7, 1949, after plaintiff became a stock-
holder and after the effective date of the statute. 
In material substance the complaint alleges: That plaintiff 
is the owner of 215 of a total of 1,235 outstanding shares of 
the Washington Holding Company, a corporation, and that 
the individual defendants concerned on this appeal own, or are 
registered as owning, shares in respectively stated numbers 
varying from 5 to 643, and aggregating 718; that the corpo-
ration, ·washington Holding Company (hereinafter called 
Washington), has owned, since 1932, described real and per-
sonal property. Four individual defendants, Shoor, Ingold, 
Jenkins and Jesson control ·vi! ashington and are the officers 
and directors thereof. Other defendants, Powell, Tanner and 
Hunt are officers of ·washington. Since the organization of 
Washington in 1932, the four individual defendants have 
conspired to acquire all the property of Washington to the 
exclusion of the other shareholders, by issuing false financial 
Rtatements of ·washington, leasing its property to organiza-
tions undrr their control for lrRs than its market rental value, 
failing to collect such rentals, representing that Mary Eloise 
Clark was a director when she was not, selling and acquiring 
stock for delinquent stock aRsessments unnecessarily levied 
during 1934-1939, and giving, in 1949, as heretofore men-
tioned, the lease vvith an option to purchase on improper 
terms. Tbe individual defendants have concealed the fore-
going· from plaintifY'. Since the action was commenced, plain-
tiff Hogan died and hifl executrix has been substituted in his 
place. 
808 HoGAN v. INGOLD [38 0.2d 
After the complaint was filed, defendants Ingold, Shoor, 
Tanner, Powell, Hunt and Jenkins moved, on the grounds 
stated in the statute, for an order requiring plaintiff to fur-
nish security as therein provided. Supporting and opposition 
affidavits were filed and the matter heard. Pursuant to the 
motion, an order was made requiring security, and plaintiff 
having failed to furnish it within the time specified, the ac-
tion was ordered dismissed as to the moving defendants. From 
the latter order this appeal is taken. 
The affidavits presented on the motion raise various mate-
rial issues of fact but, since it appears that the trial court 
based its order at least in part, and although indirectly, prob-
ably controllingly, on its finding, supported by ample evi-
dence, that plaintiff (which term is used herein as indicating 
either the decedent who commenced the action or the present 
plaintiff) was, with the exception of the one transaction al-
ready noted, not the owner, registered or otherwise, of any 
stock at the time of any of the transactions or any part thereof 
complained of and did not acquire his stock by operation of 
law from one who was a stockholder at any such time, we 
treat the case on that basis. 
Such finding, as above indicated, appears to have been sub-
stantially relied upon by the trial court in reaching its con-
clusion that there is no reasonable probability that prosecu-
tion of the cause of action alleged against the moving parties 
would benefit the corporation. It is to be noted, however, 
that the order dismissing the action is not based on a holding 
that the complaint fails to state a cause of action; rather, the 
court considered the facts as to the time and circumstances 
of plaintiff's acquirement of his stock, and the provisions of 
subdivision (a) ( 1) of section 834, and placed reliance thereon 
in reaching its conclusion that there was no reasonable prob-
ability that prosecution of the cause of action alleged would 
benefit the corporation, and hence, that it was proper to re-
quire plaintiff to furnish security for costs and attorney's 
fees in a reasonable amount. As previously mentioned, and 
now repeated for emphasis, it was for failure to furnish the 
security as ordered that the action was dismissed. Thus as 
applied here the statute did not operate to absolutely preclude 
plaintiff from maintaining the suit; it merely required him to 
furnish the security if he were to proceed further in his 
fiduciary capacity. 
[la] Plaintiff contends that her decedent as an incident of 
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acquiring ownership of the stock by purchase acquired an 
unconditional vested property right to come into equity in 
a fiduciary capacity and in that role to institute and maintain 
this action on behalf of the corporation as to all wrongs com-
plained of and that to impose the conditions prescribed by 
section 834 on the institution and maintenance of the action 
is to give the statute retroactive effect and illegally deprive 
decedent and this plaintiff of a valuable property right. This 
contention cannot be sustained; a person has no property 
right in being appointed or in acting on his own nomination 
as a guardian ad litem. He may nominate himself but he 
cannot compel the court to accept his nomination; he has no 
property right to be accepted by the court to institute and 
maintain an action in the right of another on terms beyond 
the control of the court or the Legislature. 
[2] It should be observed that section 834 is not designed 
and does not operate to deprive a shareholder of any vested 
property right. By its very words the section relates solely 
to actions which may be ''instituted or maintained in the right 
of any domestic or foreign corporation by the holder . . . of 
shares ... of such corporation." (Italics added.) [3] Since 
the statute is directed only at actions instituted or maintained 
"in the right" of the corporation it has no application to 
actions or suits seeking directly to enforce personal rights of 
shareholders. Stockholders, if they have a personal cause of 
action, are still free to sue the corporation, the majority stock-
holders, or the directors of the corporation, and to recover 
for any cause they can establish. It becomes important there-
fore to clearly understand at once the precise nature of a 
stockholder's derivative action. 
[4, 5] In Whitten v. Dabney (1915), 171 Cal. 621, 630-631 
[ 154 P. 312], this court said: "And here again it becomes 
necessary to call attention to the fact that these plaintiffs 
have no personal wrongs for which they are entitled to seek 
redress in this action. 'The stockholder does not bring such 
a suit because his rights have been directly violated, or because 
the cause of action is his or because he is entitled to the relief 
sought. He is permitted to sue in this manner simply in order 
to set in motion the judicial machinery of the court.' (3 Pom-
eroy's Equity, 3d ed., sec. 1095.) ... What is the exact situ-
ation of a plaintiff in such an action f He is a trustee pure 
and simple, seeking in the name of another a recovery for 
wrongs that have been committed against that other. His 
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position in the litigation is in every legal sense the precise 
equivalent of that of the guardian ad litem. The guardian 
ad litem stands as the representative of some person incompe-
tent to sue or be sued directly. He is appointed by the court 
to represent that incompetent's interests; to prosecute or de-
fend with the highest diligence and good faith. The stock-
holder beginning this action does not even occupy the posi-
tion of a creditor suing on his own account and on account of 
his fellow-creditors. In the latter case the creditor plaintiff 
has a direct personal interest in the litigation, and within 
limitations not here necessary to discuss, may deal with that 
litigation as his own. But the stockholder acts in purely a 
representative capacity. He is a guardian ad litem by virtue 
of statutory authority, empowered to do precisely what a 
guardian ad litem appointed by a court may do. He has gone 
into equity seeking redress for a corporation under disability 
to obtain relief itself, precisely as the guardian ad litem goes 
into court to obtain like redress for a client under disability 
by reason of incompetency or nonage. The principles govern-
ing the conduct of a guardian ad litem are in full strictness 
applicable to the conduct of such a plaintiff stockholder. Not 
only should a plaintiff in such a fiduciary capacity be willing 
to take no act that did not first receive the sanction of the 
court of equity to which he has appealed, but, more than this, 
he is not permitted to take any act without such sanction. 
( W ater·man v. Lawrence, 19 Cal. 210 [79 Am.Dec. 212].) 
·where an action is prosecuted by a guardian acl litem, the 
infant is the real party. (Bowers v. Kanaday, 94 Ga. 209 
[21 S.E. 458] .) And the guardian ad litem cannot even be 
considered a party to the cause. (Thomason v. Gray, 84 Ala. 
559 [ 4 So. 394] ; Baltimore & Oh1:o R. R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 
36 Mel. 619; Tate v. Mott, 96 N.C. 19 [2 S.E. 176] ; D~cffy v. 
Pinard, 41 Vt. 297; Ingram v. Little, L.R. 11 Q.B.Div. 251.) 
And what are the principles governing the conduct of a guard-
ian ad litem? It is the right and duty of the court to protect 
the interests of the incompetent represented by the guardian 
ad l1:tern and to exercise supervision over the conduct of that 
guardian." See, also, to like effect, Loeb v. Berman (1933), 
217 Cal. 716, 720 [20 P.2cl 685]; Rttssell v. Weyand (1935), 
5 Cal.App.2cl 259, 260, 266 [42 P.2d 381]; Spellacy v. Sttpe-
rior Court (1937), 23 Cal.App.2d 142, 147 [72 P.2d 262]. 
Speaking likewise of the character of such suits the United 
States Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Ind. Loan Corp. 
(1948), 337 U.S. 541, 549 [69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528], 
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said :2 "The very nature of the stockholder's derivative ac-
tion makes it one in the regulation of which the legislature 
of a state has wide powers. "'Whatever theory one may hold 
as to the nature of the corporate entity, it remains a wholly 
artificial creation whose internal relations between manage-
ment and stockholders are dependent upon state law and may 
be subject to most complete and penetrating regulation, either 
by public authority or by some form of stockholder action. 
Directors and managers, if not technically trustees, occupy 
positions of a fiduciary nature, and nothing in the Federal 
Constitution prohibits a state from imposing on them the 
strictest measure of responsibility, liability and accountability, 
either as a condition of assnming office or as a consequence of 
holding it. 
"Likewise, a stockholder who brings suit on a cause of 
action derived from the corporation assumes a position, not 
technically as a trnstee perhaps, but one of a fiduciary char-
acter. . . . He is a self-chosen representative and a volunteer 
champion. The Federal Constitution does not oblige the state 
to place its litigating and adjudicating processes at the dis-
posal of snch a representative, at least without imposing 
standards of responsibility, liability and accountability which 
it considers will protect the interests he elects himself to repre-
sent. . . . \Xf e conclucte that the state has plenary power 
over this type of litigation. . . . 
" [P. 552 J A statr may set the terms on which it will prr-
2 The Cohen rase, in the question ultimately decided, may be distin-
guished from the cnse here. Tl1e court there stated its problem as fol-
lows (p. 543 of 337 U.S.) : "The ultimate question here is whether a 
federal c.ourt, lmving jurisdiction of a stockholder's derivative action 
only because the parties :ue of diverse citizenship, must apply a statute 
of the forum state which makes the plaintiff, if unsuccessful, liable for 
the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, of the defense and 
entitles the corporation to require security for their payment." 
The New .Jersey statute which the court was considering was by its 
express terms declared applicable to pending actions. The action before 
the court had heen commenced about two years he.foye the statute was 
enacted. The court therefore had no occasion to consider or rule on 
the question as to whether application of the New ,Tersey Jaw woulfl 
be purely procedural and prospective in relation to actions instituted 
after its effective date. The majority held that the statute even when 
applied to create a liability in the pending case, where none had existed 
when the action wns r,ommenced, did not breach any constitutional 
guaranty and would be npplied in the federal courts. 
It would seem that if the statute were substantive, and other than 
prospective in operation, giving it effect in a pending action mj.ght 
impair the contract obligation or take property without due process. 
In the case before us no such problem nrises. The statute itself does 
not impose any liability on the plaintiff. If he chooses to bring the suit, 
however, he must meet the conditions imposed. 
' ,. 
I 
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mit litigations in its courts. No type of litigation is more 
susceptible of regulation than that of a fiduciary nature . . . 
and we think . . . it is within the power of a state to close 
its courts to this type of litigation if the condition of reason-
able security is not met.'' 
[6a] If the power of the state over this type of fiduciary 
litigation is plenary, as the Cohen case states, then surely 
such litigation is subject to regulation of the type provided 
by section 834. [7] And if section 834 is applied only to actions 
instituted after its enactment it is neither substantive in char-
acter nor retroactive in operation. It does not in and of 
itself create any liability or deprive anyone of property or of 
any vested right either with or without due process nor does 
it impair the obligation of any contract. The stockholder 
will not incur any liability for costs if he does not essay to 
bring in equity a suit in the corporation's right. If he does 
bring such a suit he knows that he will be subject to the regu-
lating provisions of the statute. [8] There is no more reason to 
doubt the applicability of the statute to a fiduciary action 
brought in respect to wrongs assertedly perpetrated before 
the statute than if it concerned wrongs happening after the 
statute as long as the action is brought after the effective date 
of the legislation. [9] In either case the operation of the 
statute is prospective and procedural because it does not de-
prive a person of any right which he had at the time of begin-
ning the suit, but merely prescribes the conditions upon which 
the subsequently instituted equity suit may be brought and 
maintained. [10] Obviously, it is only in respect to a claimed 
unconditional right to institute and maintain the fiduciary ac-
tion in the right of the corporation, and to be unconditionally 
accepted by the court in that capacity, that plaintiff's claim 
of· impairment goes. This is the only claim he can make be-
cause it is the only type of action affected by the statute and 
the statute does not abolish stockholder's derivative suits but 
merely imposes regulatory conditions on their institution and 
maintenance. Plaintiff's stock is still his; any personal rights 
of action he may possess as attributes or incidents of the stock 
are still his and, as already noted, are completely unaffected by 
section 834. 
[lh] As already pointed out, by bringing a stockholder's de-
rivative action the plaintiff nominates himself to act in a fidu-
ciary capacity substantially as a guardian ad litem for the cor-
po'ration, and he has no vested property right which compels 
the court to accept him unconditionally in that capacity. 
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[6b] The formulation of regulations for that type of litigation 
including the determination of what qualifications shall be re-
quired of a plaintiff in order that he may institute and main-
tain a suit in equity "in the right" of another is a matter mani-
festly appropriate for state legislation, which must be upheld 
so long as no constitutiomtl rights are invaded. In the light of 
the authorities already cited it is apparent that application of 
the statute under the circumstances shown here breaches no 
constitutional guaranty. 
It may be further observed that even without the enactment 
of section 834 the plaintiff here would not have been per-
mitted to maintain the suit (except possibly in relation to 
the one transaction alleged to have occurred after he acquired 
his stock) had it been brought in or transferred to (as upon 
showing a diversity of citizenship) a federal court, and that 
this court has never passed upon the question as to the ca-
pacity of a shareholder, who was not such at the time of the 
wrongs complained of, to maintain a derivative suit. Since 
Hawes v. Contra Costa Water Co. (sometimes cited as Hawes 
v. Oakland) (1881), 104 U.S. 450 [26 L.Ed. 827, 832], it has 
been the rule in the federal courts that a complaint in a deriva-
tive action must contain ''an allegation that complainant was 
a shareholder at the time of the transactions of which he com-
plains, or that his shares have devolved on him since by opera-
tion of law.'' 
This rule is now embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (rule 23(b), 28 U.S.C.A.) and is enforceable in 
the federal courts even in states which permit derivative 
suits without such a showing (Venner v. Great Northern Ry. 
Co. (1907), 153 F. 408, 411; affirmed (1908), 209 U.S. 24 
[28 S.Ct. 328, 52 L.Ed. 666] ). Decisions of the courts of the 
several states are sharply conflicting and strong arguments can 
be found in support of either policy. (See anno. 148 A.L.R. 
1091, 1097.) In California the only case substantially in 
point which has been cited to us or which our research has 
disclosed is Harvey v. JJ:leigs (1911), 17 Cal.App. 353, 364 
[119 P. 941]. The District Court of Appeal there took the 
view that the action could be maintained regardless of when 
and how ownership of the stock was acquired.3 However, in 
view of the fact that we regard section 834 as controlling on 
•see, also, Beal v. Smith (1920), 46 Cal.App.2d 271 [189 P. 341], 
which contains some discussion of the rights of such a shareholder who 
was without notice of the alleged fraudulent acts at the time he ac-
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this appeal we express no opinion as to ·whether, in the absence 
of such statute, we should follow or disapprove Harvey v. 
1J!Ieigs. 
[11] Insofar as section 834 authorizes the court on motion 
and in the exercise of a reasonable discretion to require that 
a plaintiff in a deriYatiye 1m it furnish security for "the prob-
able reasonable expenses, inclnclinl!; attorney's fees," of the 
defendants sued, "which will be incurred in the defense of 
the action,'' and requires dismissal of the action on failure of 
the plaintiff to comply with the ot'der within a reasonable time 
. fixed by the court, there is no serious question either as to 
validity or applicability of the legislation. It is almost uni-
versally held that such statutes are not regarded as being 
given retroactive effect even when applied to actions pend-
ing at the time of enactment. Certainly they are not retro-
active when applied to actions subsequently commenced (and 
this must be understood as the only respect in which a ques-
tion is before us or in which we express our view) even though 
the cause of action accrued before enactment. [12] 'l'he 
general rule is thus stated in 7 California Jurisprudence 305, 
§ 43: "[C]osts are given only by statutory direction and their 
allowance depends on the terms of the statute in force at the 
time of the accrual of the right to have them taxed. 'l'his time, 
in regard to costs on appeal, is the time of the rendition of 
the judgment on appeal. It follows that the rule pertaining 
to the allowance of costs may be changed or modified by stat. 
ute during the pendency of the proceeding.'' Directly sup-
porting the above statement, see Turner v. East B-ide Canal 
& Irr. Co. (1918), 177 Cal. 570, 571-572 [171 P. 299], and 
cases there cited; Wilson v. Nichols (1942), 55 Cal.App.2d 
678, 682 [131 P.2d 596] (hearing denied). 
[13] In 96 American Law Reports 14:28 (annotation on 
''Statute relating to costs or attorneys' fees at commencement 
or at termination of action as controlling") the law is epito-
mized as follows: "It is well settled that the question whether 
costs may be allowed in an action or suit, as well as the deter-
mination of the method of their computation, is governed 
by the law as it exists at the time of the judgment which ter-
minates the action or suit, rather than by the law as it existed 
at the time when the action or suit was commenced,-where 
barred by the statute of limitations; Earl v. Lofquist (1933), 135 Cal. 
App. 373, 376 r27 P.2d 416], which contains a statement of the rule as 
announced in Harvey v. Meigs, supra, but again the holding was that 
action was barred by the limitations statutes. 
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there is no provision in connection with the new legislation 
which clearly saves or excepts therefrom costs in pending ac-
tions." The numerous illustrative cases which are cited show 
that statutes either increasing or decreasing the allowable 
costs, including attorney fees, are consistently applied to liti-
gation pending when snch statutes became effective, unless 
a contrary intent dearly appears from the statute. 
It is noted that in 8hielcrawt v. Moffett (1945), 294 N.Y. 
180 [61 N.E.2d 435, 439, 159 A.L.R. 971], an attempt is made 
to distinguish between the recognized rule that "Liability for 
the payment of costs ... is ordinarily measured in accord-
ance 1vith the statute in effect at the time when costs and ex-
penses are fixed by order or by judgment of the court, even 
though the proceeding may have been initiated before the 
statute took effect,'' and the situation here presented of im-
posing a new requirement that security for such costs be fur-
nished by plaintiff. Whether this attempted distinction is 
sound or unsound does not now concern us and we imply no 
view on it whatsoever. In either event the case does not sup-
port the conclusion that application of section 834 to actions 
filed after its enactment would constitute retroactive appli-
cation. The holding (p. 438 of 61 N.E.) is merely that the 
New York statute permitting the corporation defendant to 
"require the plaintiff [in a derivative suit] ... to give se-
curity for the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees," 
did not apply to actions pending at the time the statute be-
came effective. Our statute, in its application to the case 
before us, involves only its effect on subsequently instituted 
actions and the Shielcrawt opinion expressly distinguishes 
such cases. The court there says (Shielcmwt v. Moffett 
(1945), supra, 294 N.Y. 180 [61 N.E.2d 435, 440, 159 A.L.R. 
971] ) : ''If the statute had been in effect when the plaintiffs 
instituted this action they might not have been able or willing· 
to give the required security; if applied to pending actions it 
might prevent these plain tiffs from trying the action after 
they had spent time and money in preparing it for trial. 
'rhough the Legislature has found that the statute is a just and 
reasonable solution of a serious problem, it does not follow 
that it would decide that it would be just and reasonable to 
apply the statute to actions then pending .... 
"It is said that, when the Ijegislature provided that the 
defendant is entitled to require the plaintiff or plaintiffs to 
grve secnrity 'in any action instituted or maintained in the 
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right of any foreign or domestic corporation,' it disclosed 
an intention that the statute should apply not only in actions 
thereafter instituted but also in actions previously 'instituted' 
and thereafter 'maintained'. The word 'maintained' may be 
used in a context where it clearly denotes that it includes 
pending actions. (Cf. George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 
289 U.S. 373, 53 S.Ct. 620, 77 L.Ed. 1265.) In other context 
it has frequently been given other construction. (See cases 
collated in 38 C.J., Maintain, §§ 2, 3, 4, 5.) In the statute we 
are now construing it is at most equivocal and does not, we 
think, disclose an intent of the Legislature that it should be 
applied in actions previously instituted.'' 
[14] Lastly, we are of the view that section 4 of the Corpo-
rations Code is pertinent. It provides that "No action ... 
commenced before this code takes effect, and no right accrued, 
is affected by the provisions of this code, but all procedure 
thereafter taken therein shall conform to the provisions of 
this code so far as possible. '' Certainly there is nothing in 
the quoted language which implies that section 834 shall not 
be applied to actions commenced after its effective date. 
[15] Since the power of the state over the institution and 
maintenance of fiduciary actions of this character is plenary 
(Cohen v. Beneficial Ind. Loan Corp. (1948), supra, 337 U.S. 
541, 550), there is no "right accrued" in the shareholder (to 
be accepted by the court as, in effect, a guardian ad litem for 
the corporation) to be affected and the declared policy of the 
state as to all procedure to be taken in derivative actions after 
the effective date of the statute should be given effect. (See 
Smallwood v. Gallardo (1927), 275 U.S. 56, 60-62 [ 48 S.Ct. 23, 
72 L.Ed. 152] .) 
For the reasons above stated the order appealed from is 
affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The main question presented is whether section 834 of the 
Corporations Code is to be applied to past transactions, that 
is, retroactively, as in the case at bar. That section requires 
two things prerequisite to the maintenance of a derivative ac-
tion by a corporation shareholder: (1) That he be a registered 
stockholder at the time the fraudulent transaction occurred 
and at the time of the commencement of the action, and (2) 
that he post security guaranteeing the payment of the ex-
penses of the defense of the suit if he is unsuccessful. 
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Before discussing the main issue certain pertinent princi-
ples should be clarified inasmuch as the majority opinion either 
casts serious doubt upon them or repudiates them. The right 
to bring such an action is the established law of this state 
and elsewhere, except under the rules of procedure of the 
federal court, whether the shareholder was or was not a regis-
tered owner when the fraud was committed. It is a substan-
tial right whether it be called procedural, property or other-
wise. It is the only method whereby the fraud of the corpo-
ration management may be exposed and restitution obtained, 
contrary to the intimation of the majority opinion. In an 
attempt to ameliorate the serious consequence of its holding, 
the majority make the following highly misleading statements: 
''Stockholders, if they have a personal cause of action, are 
still free to sue the corporation, the majority stockholders, 
or the directors of the corporation, and to recover for any 
cause they can establish. . . . Plaintiff's stock is still his; any 
personal rights of action he may possess as attributes or inci-
dents of the stock are still his and, as already noted, are com-
pletely unaffected by section 834. '' There can be no doubt 
that the majority is fully cognizant of the fact that there is 
no other remedy or cause of action known to the law avail-
able to obtain the relief sought, other than the one here in-
volved. Historically speaking the remedy here sought is 
equitable, as will appear from the discussion to follow. 
The majority cite and quote at some length from Whitten 
v. Dabney, 171 Cal. 621 [154 P. 312] relative to the capacity 
of a plaintiff in a so-called derivative action on behalf of a 
corporation and emphasis is placed upon the analogy made 
in that case between such a plaintiff and a guardian ad litem 
in the ordinary civil action. While this analogy strikes me 
as being inappropriate for obvious reasons, I can see no basis 
for resorting to terminology in order to impair plaintiff's 
right to prosecute a derivative action. It should be apparent 
that the analogy between a plaintiff in a derivative action 
and a guardian ad litem is wholly unrealistic as there is 
no requirement whatever that a guardian ad litem have any 
interest directly or indirectly in the subject matter or out-
come of the litigation. He merely stands in the place of the 
plaintiff who lacks capacity to prosecute the action in his own 
name. Such is not the case when a corporation is in control 
of officers who have committed frauds which have resulted 
in pecuniary loss to its stockholders. There is no incapacity 
on the part of such corporation to seek redress for the loss 
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sustained as the result of the fraudulent conduct of its officers, 
but the officers guilty of the fraud will not permit the corpora-
tion to sue in its own name to recover for the loss sustained. 
Hence, a stockholder who has indirectly suffered such loss 
in common with the other stockholders, has the right to prose-
cute such an action on behalf of himself and those similarly 
affected, including the corporation. Such right is a substantial 
property right as it may have the effect of substantially in-
creasing the value of the shares of stock owned by the plaintiff 
by virtue of requiring the defrauding ofiicers to return to 
the corporation the portion of its assets which they have mis-
appropriated or misused to the detriment of not only the 
corporation but the shareholders thereof. 'While it is true as 
stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Cohen 
v. Beneficial Ind. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 [69 S.Ct. 1221, 
93 L.Ed. 1528], that the plaintiff in such an action assumes 
a position of a fiduciary character, this does not mean that so 
far as his own interests are concerned, he is not acting for 
himself. The fiduciary capacity in which he serves is with 
relation to the corporation and the other stockholders whose 
interests he is seeking to advance in common with his own. 
The rule here involved is stated in Fletcher Cyclopedia 
Corporations with supporting authorities: "In several of the 
states the rule is well settled that a stockholder may sue 
although he purchased his shares after the transaction com-
plained of. And it is generally held immaterial that he pur-
chased for the purpose of acquiring the right to sue. A sub-
sequent stockholder cannot recover, however, even under 
this majority rule, (1) when he is not a bona fide stockholder, 
or (2) when himself guilty of acquiescence in the wrong, or 
( 3) when himself guilty of laches, or ( 4) where the transferor 
of the stock would have been barred from bringing suit by 
laches or acquiescence or the like." (Fletcher Cyclopedia 
Corporations, [Perm. eel.] § 5980.) The opposing view is 
chiefly represented by federal cases which are controlled by 
a rule of procedure (Fed. Rules of Civ. Proc., rule 23 [b]) 
similar to section 834. (Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, 
[Perm. ed.] § 5981.) The majority rule has been established 
in this state. (Harvey v. JJJeigs, 17 Cal.App. 353 [119 P. 
941]; see Ead v. Lofquist, 135 Cal.App. 373 [27 P.2d 416]; 
Beal v. Smith, 46 Cal.App. 271 [189 P. 341].) In the Harvey 
case the court said (p. 364): "However this may be, both 
plaintiffs in any view have, on the showing made in the com-
plaint, a right to prevent the payment of the fraudulent 
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credits shown to stand on the company's books in favor of 
defendants. And if the defendants have without considera-
tion and fraudulently appropriated $94,000 of the corporate 
funds which should be restored to its treasury, I fail to see why 
they have not a cause of action to compel such return, even 
though they acquired their shares after such misappropriation. 
(See the question fully considered in Just v. Idaho CanaL & 
Irr. Co., 16 Idaho 639 [102 P. 381, 133 Am.St.Rep. 140].)" 
'fhe majority opinion fails to point out any sound reason why 
a transferee of stock should not receive any rights of action 
incidental to ownership of the stock which the transferor 
had. There is no reason for doubting the soundness of the 
rule, for otherwise there is a grave question of discrimination. 
If a transferee cannot sue because he did not own stock when 
the fraud occurred, it would logically follow that if some 
qualified stockholder sued and recovered, the stock of the 
transferee could not benefit by the recovery. The benefit 
would have to go to his transferor. No one would advocate 
such a proposition. Hence it must follow that when the stock 
is transferred, the transfer carries with it the right to recover 
on behalf of the corporation for past frauds perpetrated by its 
officers. An expert in corporation law agrees that it is ''. . . a 
sound rule on principle as each share represents an interest 
in the entire concern and the several shareholders are entitled 
to equal rights irrespective of when they acquired their shares. 
The corporate cause of action is enforced for the benefit of 
all the shareholders.'' (Ballantine, Abuses of Shareholders 
Derivative Suits: How Far is California's New "Security 
for Expenses" ~4ct Sound Regulation? 37 Cal.L.Rev. 399, 
414.) 
Further, in this connection, and also pointing out the sub-
stantial character of the right, the United States Supreme 
Court has this to say in speaking of similar but less drastic 
New Jersey legislation than our section 834: "A.s business 
enterprise increasingly sought the advantages of incorpora-
tion, management became vested with almost uncontrolled 
discretion in handling other people's rnoney. The vast aggre-
gate of funds committed to corporate control came to be drawn 
to a considerable extent from numerous and scattered holders 
of small interests. The director was not subject to an effective 
accountability. That created strong temptation for managers 
to profit personally at expense of their trust. The business code 
became all too tolerant of s~tch practices. Corporate laws were 
lax and were not self-enforcing, and stockholders in face of 
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gravest abuses, were singularly irn.potent in obtaining redress 
of abuses of trust. 
"Equity came to the relief of the stockholder, who had no 
standing to bring civil action at law against faithless directors 
and managers. Equity, however, allowed him to step into 
the corporation's shoes andto seek in its right the restitution 
he could not demand in his own. It required him first to 
demand that the corporation vindicate its own rights, but 
when, as was usual, those who perpetrated the wrongs also 
were able to obstruct any remedy, equity would hear and 
adjudge the corporation's cause through its stockholder with 
the corporation as a defendant, albeit a rather nominal one. 
This remedy, born of stockholder helplessness, was long the 
chief regulator of corporate management and has afforded 
no small incentive to avoid at least grosser forms of betrayal 
of stockholders' interests. It is argued, and not without reason, 
that withottt it there would be little practical check on such 
abuses." (Italics added.) (Cohen v. Beneficial Ind. Loan 
Cm·p., 337 U.S. 541, 547 [69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528] .) 
And, speaking of the statutory requirement for security for 
expenses (p. 555): "However, it creates a new liability where 
none existed before, for it makes a stockholder who institutes 
a derivative action liable for the expense to which he puts 
the corporation and other defendants, if he does not make good 
his claims. Such liability is not usual and it goes beyond pay-
ment of what we know as 'costs.' If all the Act did was to 
create this liability, it would clearly be substantive. But this 
new liability would be without meaning and value in many 
cases if it resulted in nothing but a judgment for expenses 
at or after the end of the case. Therefore, a procedure is 
prescribed by which the liability is insured by entitling the 
corporate defendant to a bond of indemnity before the outlay 
is incurred. We do not think a statute which so conditions 
the stockholder's action can be disregarded by the federal 
court as a mere procedural device." (Italics added.) 
In the face of those salutary and established principles 
the majority opinion arrives at the conclusion that section 
834 was intended to apply to past transactions because, as to 
the expense security requirement, it is mere procedure, a 
proposition squarely contrary to the Cohen case, which holds 
that the requirement is more than for costs. That the statute 
would be given retroactive application in the instant case is 
clear. The last word by this court on the subject is that : 
''A retrospective law is one which affects rights, obligations, 
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acts, transactions and conditions which are performed or 
exist prior to the adoption of the statute." (Aetna Cas. & 
Surety Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 30 Cal.2d 388, 391 [182 
P.2d 159] .) There is by section 834 a requirement that 
security be posted by the plaintiff in derivative actions, and 
the plaintiff must have owned the stock when the fraud oc-
curred. The right to maintain the action by one who acquired 
stock after the perpetration of the fraud without posting 
security for expenses both existed before section 834 was 
passed. If that section is applied in this case those rights 
are being affected. The new law is one, which in the language 
of the Aetna case, affects rights, obligations and conditions 
which existed prior to its. adoption. That is true of both the 
expense and ownership requirements. 
We thus come to the question of whether it was intended 
that section 834 should be applied retroactively. "It is an 
established canon of interpretation that statutes are not to 
be given a retrospective operation unless it is clearly made to 
appear that such was the legislative intent . ... It is contended 
upon behalf of respondents that this rule of statutory con-
struction has no application to procedural statutes, and that 
section 4661 relates solely to matters of procedure or remedy. 
Feckenschaer v. Gamble, 12 Cal.2d 482 [85 P.2d 885], City of 
Los Angeles v. Oliver, 102 Cal.App. 299 [283 P. 298], San 
Bernardino Cotmty v. Industrial Ace. Com., 217 Cal. 618 [20 
P.2d 673], and Davis & McMillan v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
l 98 Cal. 631 [246 P. 1046, 46 A.L.R. 1095], are relied upon 
in support of the contention. In those cases, with one ex-
ception, it was held that the language of the statutes showed 
that the Legislature intended them to be applied retroactively, 
and the court was concerned mainly with the question of 
whether the Legislature has power to give those laws such 
retroactive effect. Since the question of the constitutionality 
of retroactive legislation and the question of the applicability of 
a rule of statutory construction are distinct (Ware v. Heller, 
63 Cal.App.2d 817, 821 [148 P.2d 410] ), these cases are not 
in point. . . . If substantial changes are made, even in a stat-
ute which might ordinarily be classified as procedural, the 
operation on existing rights wonld be retroactive because the 
legal effects of past events would be changed, and the statute 
will be construP,d to operate only in fuhtro unless the legislative 
intent to the contrary clearly appears." (Italics added.) 
(Aetna Cas. &- Surety Co. v. Indttstrial Ace. Com., 30 Cal.2d 
388, 393 [182 P.2d 159].) That the change in the law 
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wrought by the adoption of section 834 is substantial and 
does affect existing rights is too obvious to require further 
discussion. True, section 834 states that no action may be 
''instituted or maintained,'' but that is not sufficient to abro-
gate the rule that to be construed as retroactive in operation 
on substantial rights a statute must clearly so state. In Shiel-
arawt v. Moffett, 294 N.Y.180 [61 N.E.2d 435, 159 A.L.R. 971], 
the court had before it a New York statute similarly phrased, 
which required posting of security for costs if plaintiff in a 
derivative action owned less than a specified percentage of 
stock. The court interpreted the statute as not applicable to 
an action which was commenced before its adoption, and while 
it mentioned a possible distinction between that situation and 
where the action was commenced later, it emphasized the 
nature of the right affected as substantial and invoked the 
rule of construction against retrospective operation, stating 
(p. 440 [61 N.E.2d]): "It is said that, when the Legislature 
provided that the defendant is entitled to require the plaintiff 
or plaintiffs to give security 'in any action instituted or main-
tained in the right of any foreign or domestic corporation,' 
it disclosed an intention that the statute should apply not 
only in actions thereafter instituted but also in actions previ-
ously 'instituted' and thereafter 'maintained.' The word 
'maintained' may be used in a context where it clearly denotes 
that it includes pending actions. Cf. George Moore Ice Cream 
Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 53 S.Ct. 620, 77 L.Ed. 1265. In 
other context it has frequently been given other construction. 
See cases collated in 38 C.J., Maintain §§ 2, 3, 4, 5. In the 
statute we are now construing it is at most equivocal and 
does not, we think, disclose an intent of the Legislature that 
it should be applied in actions previously instituted." A 
reasonable interpretation is that the use of the phraseology 
in section 834 that no action may be ''instituted or maintained'' 
unless the stock ownership at the time of the transaction is 
alleged, and security is posted if required, is merely another 
way of stating that a shareholder has no right of action on 
behalf of the corporation unless those conditions exist or are 
complied with. Such construction carries no retroactive im-
plication. It does not necessarily point to an intent to have 
the statute operate on accrued rights. At best those words 
are equivocal and must be read in the light of section 4 of the 
Corporations Code that: "No action or proceeding commenced 
before this code takes effect, and no right accrued, is affected 
by the provisions of this code, but all procedure thereafter 
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taken therein shall conform to the provisions of this code 
so far as possible.'' True, reference is made to procedural 
statutes as applying to pending actions, but "rights" are 
also mentioned and here we have involved substantial rights. 
Section 4 is .similar to a provision reading: "No part of it is 
retroactive, unless expressly so declared." ( Civ. Code, § 3; 
Code Civ. Proc., § 3; Pol. Code, § 3.) That provision in 
those codes has been held to apply to amendments or additions 
to them as well as the original codes. (Estate of Frees, 187 
Cal. 150 [201 P. 112]; Teralta Land & Water Co. v. Shaffer, 
116. Cal. 518 [ 48 P. 613, 58 Am.St.Rep. 194] ; Blade v. Superior 
Court, 102 Cal.A.pp. 375 [283 P. 81].) 
Furthermore, it should be remembered that section 834 
embraces the requirement of shareholding at the time named 
as well as the requirement of security in one cohesive coverage 
regulating derivative actions. It is not to be supposed that part 
of it is to be retroactive but not the remainder, the security 
mandate and stockholder prerequisite, for the first sentence 
purports to require all of the conditions to be on the same 
footing. There can be no doubt that the stock ownership re-
quirement would operate upon a prior accrued right of vital 
importance. 
In connection with the ownership requirement it should be 
observed that the majority opinion does not discuss that 
phase of section 834, with reference to retroactivity. It holds 
the expense security requirement either is not being applied 
retrospectively, or even if it is, that is a proper construction 
of it. If such is true of that part of the section it must also 
be true of the ownership requisite, unless it is said that the 
parts of the section are severable, a problem heretofore men-
tioned by me but not even discussed in the majority opinion. 
If the majority thinks there is severability, it need not dis-
cuss the ownership :feature. Otherwise it must. 
The majority opinion endeavors to sidestep the owner-
ship question by the statement: '' A.s previously mentioned, 
. . . it was for failure to furnish the security as ordered that 
the action was dismissed. Thus as applied here the statute 
did not operate to absolutely preclude plaintiff from main-
taining the suit; it merely required him to furnish the security 
if he were to proceed further in his fiduciary capacity.'' That 
is not true in any realistic sense. The majority concedes that 
the trial court based its dismissal of the action solely upon the 
fact that plaintiff was not an owner of stock when the fraud 
was committed. It was on that basis, and that alone, that 
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the expense security was ordered by the court. The dismissal 
followed when the security was not furnished. But, neverthe-
less, it was in effect based upon the lack of stock ownership. 
It is idle to reason, as does the majority, that plaintiff was not 
injured because he could have posted the security and thus 
avoided dismissal. If he had supplied it, he would have suf-
fered the burden imposed by section 834, and his complaint 
would be subject to dismissal on general demurrer for it shows 
that he was not an owner of stock when the fraud occurred. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that there are grave ques-
tions of constitutionality involving equal protection of the law 
which were not decided in Cohen v. Beneficial Ind. Loan Corp., 
supra, 337 U.S. 541, in connection with the requirement that 
security be posted to cover expenses including attorney's 
fees and that such expenses shall be allowed against the 
security if the action is unsuccessful. A situation is presented 
where the plaintiff must pay the defendant's attorney's fees 
if unsuccessful, but the defendant is not required to pay 
plaintiff's counsel fees if the latter wins. Such a statute is 
invalid unless there is some reason why plaintiffs are in a 
different position than defendants. (See Chicago & N. W. Ry. 
Co: v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35 [43 S.Ct. 55, 
67 L.Ed. 115]; Atchison etc. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96 
[19 S.Ct. 609, 43 L.Ed. 909] .) It may be argued that because 
of the danger of spite suits, bad faith suits, by stockholders in 
derivative actions it is proper to place those actions in a 
separate class, but that cannot apply here. Under section 
834 plaintiff is to post security for attorney's fees when it 
appears on the motion therefor that the corporation would not 
benefit by the action. Suppose the court finds the corporation 
would probably benefit by the action, then the corporation 
should be required to post security for plaintiff's counsel fees, 
a wholly reasonable demand because the corporation is the one 
that benefits by the recovery; the action is on its behalf and 
ultimately for the good of all stockholders. Section 834 makes 
no such provision, however, and for that reason is strongly 
suspect of denying equal protection of the law. 
I would therefore reverse the order of dismissal. 
Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 15, 
1952. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
